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ПРОДОЛЖЕНИЕ
Furthermore a rentier state is characterized through the fact that only a few number of persons, some kind of elite circle, is dealing with the development and management of rents, so called rentiers. In this context Beblawi/Luciani and other authors defined rentiers as an autonomous social group (ibid, 50). This is mostly characterized through a rent-seeking culture (Erdmann/Engel 2006, 28) or a rentier mentality (Beblawi/Luciani 1987, 52, Yates 1996, 20-22). Despite of that the majority of a country’s population has passively to wait for the distribution or utilization of the rents (e.g. Moore 2004, Yates 1996). The main consequence here is that rents free the state from the need to extract income from the domestic economy and the domestic people through taxes. The government can embark on large public expenditure programs without resorting taxation (Moore 2004, Sandbakken 2006, Schmid 1997). Oil revenues lead to certain autonomy of the state towards its society (“no taxation – no representation“, Herb 2005). This it what Luciani called an allocation state. The opposite form is the production state, which relies on taxation of the domestic economy for its income. In a production state taxpayers stay involved with government decisions by supporting them with onerous taxes. An allocation state, by contrast, does not depend on domestic sources of revenues. The primary goal of the allocation state is to spend money in egoistic and prestige oriented projects, delivering profits for those elites that are involved in the extraction of the resource revenues (Luciani 1987, 63-82). Oil rents accrue directly to the state, which leads to loyalty through patron-client networks, which as well increase political stability and ensure certain measures of legitimacy (Smith 2005).
Apart from this, resource-related wealth creates a social structure that is not favourable to democracy: Following modernization theories, independent middle and labour classes are important sources of democratic oppositions and a tool for democratization. Especially middle classes are missing in rentier states. The merchant class and traditional elites are replaced by a ‘rentier class’ of civilian technocrats in the public administration (Sandbakken 2006, 139). Yates defined the development of a ‘rentier class’ with a ‘rentier mentality’, reflecting the fundamental difference between earned and not earned incomes. Rewards and wealth in the rentier class are regarded as the result of rent opportunities not of work (Yates 1996, 22). That’s why rentier states especially face problems like patronage and corruption as well as bribery and nepotism (Sandbakken 2006, 138). Later on we will show that this is a special problem in our two case studies as well.
Features of the Post-Soviet Rentier State
1. Elite power in oil and gas contract conclusions
2. Selfish, corrupt and permanent elites
3. Support purchased through rent allocation
4. Deficits in the regulation of economic structures
5. Missing concepts of distribution
6. Weak or missing transparency
7. Medium legitimacy of resource policy
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